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In his bookDe l’habitude (Of Habit), 1838,
the philosopher and archeologist Felix
Ravaisson deals with the study of habit by
using a broad spectrum of sources ranging
from Aristotle to Butler, Leibniz, Hume,
Main de Biran and Schelling, among oth-
ers. The combination of these authors
together with the originality of Ravaisson’s
own results produces a work which,
though brief, has inspired some of the
most important contemporary philoso-
phers1. Moreover, this book has recently
(2008) been translated into English for the
first time, which has favored its rediscovery
and redefinition in the context of current
debates. Indeed, Ravaisson seems to have
found in the study of habit a key point for
the solution of some of the fundamental
problems of philosophy such as the rela-
tionship between mind and body, nature
and freedom, and nature and culture
(Carlisle, 2013). Moreover, his approach is
distinguished from the dominant method
that from Descartes onwards has been
focused on the study of consciousness
rather than precisely on habit.
Ravaisson’s approach currently remains
as challenging as in his own time. This
is because the anthropological concep-
tion of cognitive science is based on a
clearly defined and tacitly assumed axiom:
that human beings are essentially thinking
beings, demonstrating that cartesianism is
as valid today as in the days of Ravaisson.
And for that reason, the traditional posi-
tion of neuroscience tends to ignore
1Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Paul Ricoeur in phe-
nomenology, Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze in
vitalism, andWilliam James and John Dewey in amer-
ican pragmatism.
the importance of habit (Noë, 2009).
In this article we will examine how the
study of the nature of habit applies to
the mind-body problem and discuss the
ontological status of habit, as well as the
habit-consciousness relationship.
In his essay La vie et l’ oeuvre de
Ravaisson (1938/2009), the philosopher
Henri Bergson says that the workOf Habit,
despite having a modest title, is a treatise
on the philosophy of nature, as it offers
answers to key questions such as “What
is nature? How to represent its inside?
What does it hide under the regular suc-
cession of causes and effects? Does it cover
something or is it reduced, in short, to
a whole array of completely superficial
movements that mechanically engage one
another?” (pp. 266–267). This last ques-
tion is key regarding the issue addressed
here. Ravaisson, naturally reluctant to the
great metaphysical constructs, will find the
right tool to answer this question in such a
daily occurrence as the habit. According to
Bergson’s interpretations, the inner expe-
rience shows that the habit is an activ-
ity that has passed, by insensible degrees,
from consciousness to unconsciousness,
and from voluntary to involuntary action.
This seems to suggest that nature is a kind
of obscured consciousness, or sleepy will2.
Now, why does the habit play such a
crucial role in the ravaissonian concep-
tion of the mind-body or mind-matter
problem? One could start by saying that
the habit “is [. . .] a disposition relative to
change, which is engendered in a being
2Bergson finds in Ravaisson the bases of his theory of
élan vital, and of nature as obscured consciousness.
by the continuity or the repetition of this
very same change” (Ravaisson, 1838/2008;
p. 25) and is “a general, permanent way
of being” (Ravaisson, 1838/2008; p. 25).
The habit, according to Ravaisson, is not
possible at the inorganic level (physical,
chemical, and mechanical), but it is organ-
ically possible. This is because the physical
bodies are subject to external influences,
i.e., to the general laws of matter, while
living things have a nature that remains
constant in the midst of change. For this
reason, there is individuality only where
there is life.
The author defines the realm of the
inorganic as the “empire of Destiny,”
and the organic realm as the “empire of
Nature” (Ravaisson, 1838/2008; p. 31). So,
the habit occurs, ontologically speaking, in
nature, in the living world. And the law of
habit is the development of a spontaneity
that runs through the dichotomy between
the “mechanical Fatality” and the “reflec-
tive Freedom,” as it is not identified with
either of those. The habit is an “inclina-
tion that follows from the will” (Ravaisson,
1838/2008; p. 55), i.e., an idea—result
of reflection and willingness—that grad-
ually transforms in being, in “substan-
tial idea” (Ravaisson, 1838/2008; p. 55)
or in “thought in action” (Ravaisson,
1838/2008; p. 59). In other words, an
idea that gradually naturalizes, an action
that, as a result of repetition, impercep-
tibly moves from the understanding and
the will, to nature. So Nature is the limit
of habit: “In descending gradually from
the clearest regions of consciousness, habit
carries with it light from those regions into
the depths and dark night of nature. Habit
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is an acquired nature, a second nature
that has its ultimate ground in primitive
nature, but which alone explains the
latter to the understanding” (Ravaisson,
1838/2008; p. 59). The purely biological
sphere is a sort of lower limit, while the
sphere of reason and the will is the upper
limit. Therefore, the habit flows from the
upper limit to the lower limit, revealing
a continuity underlying along the whole
spectrum3.
Certainly, it is in connecting those lim-
its that habit plays a more prominent role
and in which is revealed as a key to search
for answers to the mind-body problem. As
mentionedabove, thehabit is an action that
harmoniously unites the area of freedom,
intentionality, reflection and will with our
most primitive nature4 and includes there-
fore two vectors: an open temporality in
which the future is not contained in the
present, but where the present places cer-
tain regularities or patterns that anticipate
what the future may include; and a living
being whose activities may be modified by
the incorporation of stereotyped behaviors
(Grosz, 2013). Considering both vectors,
the habit can be conceived as a complex
phenomenon that is part, concomitantly,
of our consciousness, and of our natural
tendencies or impulses. One could argue
that the habit is, then, a kind of instinct,
or learned impulse that becomes standard
of behavior.
But Ravaisson is cautious in speaking of
habit and instinct. These functions are not
identifiable because there is a difference of
degree among them. Instinct is thought-
less, necessary, and perfectly spontaneous;
devoid of any will and consciousness.
The habit, however, has its starting point
in consciousness and never completely
ignores it (Malabou, 2008). However, the
difference between habit and instinct can
be reduced ad infinitum as the habit is
strengthened by repeated and prolonged
exercise. As pointed out by one of its most
important scholars, in habit “the facility in
an action gained through its repetition can
become a pre-reflective desire, tendency
or inclination to carry out the act [. . .]
but this inclination, in turn, can develop
into the almost completely involuntary
3Ravaisson refers primarily to motor habits.
4The ravaissonian thesis unifying the ideal and the
reality by habit, reflects the influence of Schelling.
phenomena that we know as tics” (Sinclair,
2011a,b). This ravaissonian idea is deeply
original and important, because it high-
lights an aspect that is not present in other
authors (including neuroscientists and
contemporary philosophers). This aspect
refers to the existence of an impercepti-
ble gradualness in the process of acquiring
the habit, and therefore, to the existence of
habits with different degrees of strengthen-
ing or consolidation. For example, novice
driver has certain visual-motor skills that
undoubtedly constitute a habit. But the
level of strengthening of that habit is not
comparable to the case of a rally driver.
In the novice driver, the habit is not
yet sufficiently near to the lower limit.
In between the extremes—the beginner
level and expert level—, there are count-
less intermediate levels. In the begin-
ner, reasoning and free will still have
a huge role, while the habit of driv-
ing is almost instinctive in the expert
driver. According to the ravaissonian the-
sis, there seems to be an inverse rela-
tionship between consciousness and habit:
more consciousness, less habit; more habit
less consciousness. However, it should be
stressed that, according to the author, at
no time is consciousness completely elimi-
nated. Recently, neuroscience has verified
Ravaisson’s assertions: experts with very
entrenched habits significantly drop their
brain activation level; that is, the more
established you have a habit, the brain
must work less. Which implies a signifi-
cant reduction in muscle activity, gain in
precision and elegance, and energy savings
(Noë, 2009).
It is also possible to correlate the philo-
sophical concept of habit and brain plas-
ticity. The presence of habits in the organic
world reveals the existence of a limit for
change. Without habits, lifetime would be
subject to the circumstances and com-
pletely adrift. Conversely, if habits would
prevent any possibility of change, life
would be reduced to a mere mechanism.
The concept of plasticity, understood in
the terms applied to the brain, i.e., its
own ability to change itself, summarizes
the two conditions of habit: (a) the con-
dition of resistance to change; and (b) the
condition for flexibility and variation. In
other words, the habit is a form of resis-
tance to change gradually acquired, that
shows at the same time, the ability of
living beings to change. On this, Carlisle
states: “. . .while contemporary accounts
of the brain’s plasticity help us to under-
stand the processes of habit formation,
philosophical reflection on habit helps us
to understand the significance of plastic-
ity” 5 (Carlisle, 2014; p. 22). Therefore,
Ravaisson’s ideas about the habit and the
theory of neural plasticity can be mutually
reinforcing.
On the other hand, the process of
acquiring the habit modifies both the
mind and body, “there is, therefore, a
single force, a single intelligence that is,
in the life of man, the principle of all
this functions and forms” (Ravaisson,
1838/2008; p. 65). According to the lat-
ter reference, the mind-body relationship
would not be explained as the articula-
tion of two substances, even two prop-
erties. Mind and body form the ends
(upper and lower limits) of a continuum6
in which the habit gradually down-flows.
Certainly Ravaisson admits it is not possi-
ble to apodictically prove the absolute con-
tinuity between the two limits, and there-
fore, the existence of one and the same
principle. The continuum, the underlying
dark unit, harmonizing principle postu-
lated by the philosopher of Namur, is only
a possibility and an assumption that can-
not be verified in nature. However, this
presumption is inferred from the pro-
gression of habit because “. . . it draws
its proof from it, by the most power-
ful of analogies” (Ravaisson, 1838/2008;
p. 65). Ravaisson’s argument compels us
to think the habit from outside the pre-
dominant dualistic paradigm of moder-
nity, and offers a phenomenological and
metaphysically superior explanation.
Then, the habit is not a mere acci-
dent in the world of life, but the key
to their organization and their subsis-
tence, being a structural component in
it, regardless of their level of complex-
ity or stage of development. On the other
hand, considered from the social point of
view, “When we contract habits from oth-
ers by sharing spaces, practices, routines
and rhythms, and a language, communi-
cation and interaction become easier and
less effortful, and communal life becomes
5For a neuroscientific approach to processes of habit
formation, see Graybiel (2008).
6Ravaisson inherited the notion of continuum from
Leibniz.
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more harmonious” (Carlisle, 2013). The
habit, whatever the angle from which it
is considered, is a unifying element that
reveals the existence of continuities in the
human being individually or collectively
understood. Where there is habit, there is
order and connection. Considering all this,
it is not absurd to claim that the habit is
the clearest expression of the continuum.
This seems to be the ontological value of
the habit in Ravaisson’s work.
But this is not all. It should be added
that the habit does not mechanize or
reduce consciousness to unconsciousness
or to mere automatism, but “it brings
about a new kind of consciousness, one
not aware of itself but prone to act, that
is activated by the possibility of its acting,
that knows but cannot know that it knows”
(Grosz, 2013). The ravaissonian concep-
tion of consciousness differs substantially
from the cartesian conception that iden-
tifies it with reflective thought, will and
therefore with knowledge. The ravaisso-
nian consciousness has degrees (like the
habit); in fact, in some of them it does
not know but it acts, and acting produces
effects (actions and feelings); that con-
sciousness is always near instinct, and in
its daily application through habit it opens
to the possibility of creation, transforma-
tion, and learning. Thus seen, the habit,
far from being mere mechanical automa-
tion, is possibility of innovation through
the acquisition of new traits and skills, and
openness to the future.
The author shows the habit manifests
the inhabitation of freedom and intelli-
gence in the body (Carlisle, 2013). Indeed,
the process of acquiring the habit involves
a shift from free reflection to the primi-
tive nature in order to obtain that second
nature (to which we refer above), but this
in turn serves as a platform for further
actions of free reflection. Put succinctly,
the habit is the condition of possibility of
conscious actions. For example, if a musi-
cian composes a song, the realization of
this purpose involves the previous acqui-
sition of physical and intellectual habits
such as management of musical instru-
ments and of singing techniques, mastery
of musical notation and music theory,
etc. The most original manifestations of
intelligence and freedom are the result of
habit.
So, the habit operates in two direc-
tions fulfilling a sort of recursive func-
tion within the mind-body continuum:
downwards, ranging from consciousness
to nature (in the process of acquisition);
and upwards, ranging from nature to con-
sciousness (once it has taken hold). This
double movement attributed by Ravaisson
to habit, shows an original anthropolog-
ical conception, refractory of any dual-
ism or reductionism. Indeed, according
to the philosopher, humanity is not con-
fined to the res cogitans, or mere brainhood
(as postulated in the mainstream of cur-
rent neuroscience). The human being is an
embodied subjectivity, is a self, the most
genuine form of unity.
Thus, the study on habit done by
Ravaisson offers a phenomenologic-
metaphysical answer to the so-called hard
problem of philosophy of mind; an answer
long forgotten and hard to locate in the
complex map of current theories, which
can still provide interesting clues not only
to philosophy but also to the current
neuroscience of habit.
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